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This article argues for the analysis of public engagement as an essentially mediated activity. 
Although recent studies note “that” academic knowledge is increasingly being made available 
for consumption by non-academic audiences, they tell us little about “how” it gets 
recontextualised whilst passing through the hands of media professionals on its way towards 
such audiences. In Burawoy’s (2005) influential call for the rebirth of public sociology, for 
instance, just as in the debates his work provoked, the media is treated solely as a means for 
the transportation of knowledge. But as this article demonstrates, the media does not simply 
transport knowledge; it also, and at the same time, translates that knowledge in various, 
rhetorically consequential ways. Focusing on the mediated trajectory of an attempt by a group 
of British academics to connect with audiences beyond academia, their initial contribution is 
compared to its subsequent translation(s) across various British newspapers. A discursive 
analysis reveals the techniques via which a classic form of ‘public sociology’, wherein a 
seemingly personal trouble was refigured as an obviously public issue, came to be 
recontextualised such that, remarkably, these authors were left appearing to voice nothing but 
their own petty prejudices. The article concludes by noting that where public engagement 
increasingly involves mediation, public sociology needs to take more seriously the 
recontextualizing affordances of media discourse.  
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Introduction  
In an increasingly mediated world little of the sociology we see, hear, read, laugh or get 
annoyed about in public culture does not at some stage pass through the hands, mouths, pens 
and typing fingers of intermediaries – journalists, bloggers, internet “trolls”, university 
marketing officers – before reaching its various audiences. To be sure, the advent of social – 
or “new” – media has allowed for a distinctly ‘dis-intermediated’ form of communication to 
develop between scholars and their publics (Healy, 2017: 771). But even here, our tweets, 
blogposts (or whatever) only ever reach beyond a small network of similarly minded scholars 
as and when they are picked-up by “old” media ‘presenters’ (Gans, 2016) – i.e. journalists, 
media personalities, broadcasters – who then repackage that information for consumption by 
massified audiences. Indeed, new and old media have now converged to the extent that an 
academics initial choice of communicational forum is largely irrelevant: a tweet in one 
context can quickly get filleted and networked into any number of other sites by presenters 
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and/or new media ‘citizen journalists’ (Small 2008). There is, in other words, an always 
already translated (Latour 1988), emplotted (White 1978), entextualised (Bauman and Briggs, 
1990), grafted (Derrida 1977) or, as I prefer to describe it, re-contextualised character to all 
forms of public engagement that enter, and circulate within, public debate (also see 
Attenborough, 2014; 2015; 2016). In this article I explore the ways in which this process of 
recontextualisation, of communicating sociological knowledge from context to context, 
changes the level of authorial control that academics have over work offered-up during public 
engagement activities.  
Of course, it is not just the exponential growth of new and old media, with all their 
attendant interactional affordances, that have reshaped the terrain upon which public 
intellectuals operate. Knowledge interests that we might, following Habermas (1979), 
describe as ‘emancipatory’ have long motivated some, if not most, academics to engage with 
audiences beyond the academy (see Giroux, 2011). Feminist academics, for example, 
precisely as incumbents of the category “feminist academics”, have always refused to treat 
the disciplinary world of academia as if separable from the realm of political activism. 
Indeed, many of the academics discussed later in this article orient to a tradition of feminist 
scholarship in which commitment to, and the pursuit and promotion of, gender equality sets 
the conditions of possibility for research in which “the public” is as much an intended 
audience as “other academics”. But this vision of public engagement, whereby academics 
choose to engage with various publics for emancipatory ends, is now supplemented by an 
instrumentalist vision in which engagement with external ‘partners’ and ‘stakeholders’ is 
seen as a good in and of itself, and something that all academics should therefore be 
incentivized to pursue (e.g. NCCPE, 2012; RCUK, 2013a, 2013b). The relatively recent 
adoption by European universities of organizational strategies, structures and values most 
commonly associated with the private sector goes some way towards explaining how we got 
here, to this new and increasingly valorised form of knowledge. In the new ‘corporate 
university’ (Giroux, 2011: 145) what is and is not valuable research is assessed and audited in 
the language of productivity: time/effort expended on research is now to be exceeded by the 
value of outputs generated, where “value” is measured not just by articles published but by 
commercialised products spun-off and/or governmentally cherry-picked social problems 
ameliorated. In the UK, the notion of “impact” has helped valorise this type of 
instrumentalism, injecting governmental, economic and managerial genres of discourse into 
the institutional talk, texts and practices of academia. The Economic and Social Research 
Council’s regular ‘funding calls’, for instance, place the onus on applicants to demonstrate 
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that and how projects will generate not just ‘academic impact’ within the academy, but 
‘economic and social’ impact without, usually in collaboration with external ‘project 
partners’ (RCUK 2015). Perhaps unsurprisingly, debates about impact have predominantly 
focused on its consequences for academic freedom, autonomy and criticality (e.g. Collini 
2012). But the burgeoning co-dependency between impact and public engagement is no less 
intriguing. The relatively recent adoption of impact as a significant component of the UK 
sector’s performance-based funding system, the Research Excellence Framework (REF), 
makes clear the nature of this co-dependency. HEFCE, the body responsible for overseeing 
REF, defines impact to incorporate not just the achievement but also the seeking of impact 
(Dunleavy, 2012). Co-dependency is also stimulated by the ‘impact summaries’ and 
‘pathways to impact’ statements that now feature as mandatory sections of RCUK funding 
bids: both require prospective planning of public engagement activities, and, in the case of 
successful bids, retrospective reflections on the success of those activities (RCUK, 2015). 
Academics are in this way tested ‘not so much for their impact, but for their attempts to 
achieve impact…and their capacity to positively manipulate societal concerns by 
democratizing their knowledge’ (Watermeyer, 2012: 120). 
The point here is that to ‘democratize knowledge’ is at least in part to utilise the 
media as a communicational resource. What we find, then, is that university-led attempts to 
reframe knowledge in terms of its socio-economic “impact” are encouraging ever more 
academics to pursue public engagement activities within a mediated terrain that remains 
relatively uncharted. This, of course, is fine – it is, after all, the promise of impact oriented 
public engagement to disseminate critical scholarship to the widest possible audience (also 
see Downey, 2017). But there are potential pitfalls too. One of the fundamental 
characteristics of mediated knowledge is that it never simply diffuses away from source, 
reaching intended audiences in pristine form. In that the media facilitates the communication 
of information and intervenes within that process (Tomlinson, 1999), knowledge is always 
translated as it is transported from academic to non-academic contexts. These translations 
may or may not be readably adequate. But they are rarely anything other than ‘beyond our 
control’ (Buckingham 2013, 51). And it is because the media acts in this way that ‘we have 
only limited opportunities, and limited power, to determine how our [i.e. academic] work will 
be represented in the public domain’ (Buckingham 2013, 52). Curiously, however, the 
literature on public engagement sheds little empirical light on the issue of how these 
processes of recontextualisation affect academic knowledge as it is turned into public 
knowledge. Consider, for instance, Burawoy’s (2005) highly influential call for the rebirth of 
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a truly public sociology. This type of sociology should, he argued, display less ‘disciplinary 
imagination’ (i.e. reformulating private-troubles as public issues for the purposes of arcane 
debates taking place inside the academy via the medium of analyst-driven meta-languages) 
and rather more of that which Mills (1958) termed the ‘sociological imagination’ (i.e. 
reformulating those same troubles as public issues but only now as contributions to societal 
debates taking place in the public sphere via the medium of everyday languages). Burawoy’s 
references to the media are brief, and it is this brevity that is of analytic interest here. To 
suggest that traditional public sociologists are those ‘who write in the opinion pages of our 
national newspapers where they comment on matters of public importance’ (2005: 7) is to 
background a whole array of intermediary presenters – journalists, editors, sub-editors, and so 
on – who prepare any given sociologists work for publication. It is unlikely that the final 
lexical, syntactic and rhetorical details of any published newspaper article, from its footing 
and focalisation shifts through to its added (or deleted) nominalisations and its manipulations 
of graphology, captions, headings and sub-headings, deictic markers, represented speech 
types and action descriptions will be a direct facsimile of a sociologists original words. And it 
is, of course, in the differences between what a sociologist wrote and “what a sociologist 
wrote” that we can find features of rhetorical – and semantic – consequence.  
Much of the literature that followed Burawoy’s (2005) intervention is marked by 
similarly ‘black-boxed’ versions of the media. Buckingham’s (2013) already cited article, for 
instance, acknowledges that ‘we’ only have ‘limited opportunities’ to determine how our 
work gets represented in the media. But in the case-studies of prominent public intellectuals 
that follow, media headlines are too often assumed as evidence of their “high-profile 
statements”. In this way, an opportunity to study how their original statements were 
recontextualised as “their original statements” is lost. Similarly, in discussions of feminist 
public engagement that should be directly relevance to this article’s own case-study, 
references to the media very rarely go beyond impressionistic glosses. Gill (2011: 61), for 
instance, writes of how ‘sexism’, a term so crucial to second-wave feminists as they sought to 
engage public audiences, was eventually ‘mocked and hijacked by the media’; in a discussion 
of academic feminist activism, Braun (2013: 531) refers to the media as ‘not our friend’; and 
Boynton’s (2012: 536) discussion of innovative feminist media practices suggests that, in the 
mainstream media, ‘critical thinking or evidence [is] often sidelined’ (Boynton, 2013: 536-
537), and/or ‘excluded, pigeonholed, mocked or misrepresented’, with the result that media 
engagement ‘may come with risks to our reputations’. Important observations of course; but 
observations that tell us very little about “how” this ‘mocking’ and ‘misrepresenting’ is 
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rhetorically, discursively and performatively constituted in and as part of mediated 
recontextualisation of feminist knowledge.  
If I am in danger of labouring this point, it is because it is important one. In settings 
where academics write/speak for themselves they have a stake in formulating their work in 
accurate ways. In any mediated recontextualisation, however, a journalist (or ‘presenter’) gets 
to reformulate “it” on behalf of its original author(s). Academics in this way lose control of 
their words whilst all the while appearing to their (mediated) audiences as if still in control of 
them. Media discourse, as we shall see during the following case-study, can – but crucially 
does not have to – present academic knowledge in accurate, and thereby positive ways.  
 
‘What Miss Really Means’ 
To capture some of these communicational challenges “in-flight”, as it were, I turn now to 
examine a body of sociological knowledge that began life as snippets of talk extracted from 
interviews with academics and then integrated into a Times Educational Supplement article 
entitled ‘What Miss really means’ (Bloom, 2014; henceforth WMRM). In global narrative 
terms WMRM can be decomposed into two constituent parts. There is first a description of a 
small, localised incident which is then followed by an explanation of how that small, 
localised incident can (and should) be seen as the result of wider societal trends, issues and 
problems. This practice of providing explanatory “links” that purport to connect locally 
engendered data to the wider social forces that (allegedly) shape such data, is a well-
established part of what it means to do public sociology (also see Pomerantz, 1984). Indeed, 
WMRM is a perfect example of the sociological imagination in action: a private trouble is 
being measured up for its transformation into a public issue (Burawoy, 2005; Mills, 1959). In 
what follows, and for reasons that will hopefully become clear, it is the telling of that small, 
localised incident that constitutes the focus of our investigation.  
 What, then, does this incident involved? WMRM begins with a story in which an 
academic sociologist – Jennifer Coates – describes an experience she had whilst volunteering 
as a teacher at a secondary school. We learn of her surprise that, despite having been 
introduced as “Professor Coates”, students quickly started to call her “Miss” (see Extract 1, 
below). The telling of this incident is defensively designed: it is made difficult for us to read 
“it” as anything other than a symptom of some as yet unidentified public issue. Alternative 
readings whereby what happened might be explainable as the effect of personal troubles – 
simple misunderstandings, mishearings, Coates’ fragile ego, etc. – were pre-empted and 
designed-out. This cues us to find plausible, interesting and revelatory the explanations taking 
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place later in the article, as various social facts – linguistic socialisation, gender inequality, 
etc. – are depicted as the external constraints connecting this classroom-bound interaction to 
the wider society in which it took place. Initial description and subsequent explanation are 
thus aligned: the latter provides for a sociologically imaginative claim whilst the former 
evidences the need for the imagination. From this one, solitary incident we travel, logically 
and compellingly, towards a discussion of the types of linguistic reforms capable of 
generating less asymmetric, and by implication less gendered terms of address than Sir and 
Miss for male and female teachers. We, as readers, are given nowhere to go but sociological. 
 In nearly all recontextualised versions of WMRM, however, things were quite 
otherwise. In various rhetorically significant ways, the details of that initial incident were 
changed but then passed on (or perhaps “off”) as if they had simply been transported, word 
for word, from WMRM. Where WMRM’s description of the incident was defensively 
designed, these recontextualised descriptions are rendered defensively vulnerable. Coates’s 
experiences become immediately, and obviously, interpretable as the result of personal 
troubles – simple misunderstandings, mis-hearings, her fragile ego, etc. As readers, we are 
thus cued to find the sociological explanations that follow ridiculous, facile and egocentric. 
Having been granted this meta-position, having already seen this incident for what it really 
was, we are invited to laugh at Coates and the ‘arrant idiots’ (Express Online, 2014), 
‘lunatics’ (Daily Telegraph, 2014), ‘bonkers’ feminists and ‘Potty PC Profs’ (The People, 
2014) she is shown associating with as they attempt to evaluate this same incident as if it 
really were a public issue. In this way, description and explanation are pulled apart: the latter 
cannot but appear im-plausible, un-interesting and obfuscatory because the former has 
already revealed, to us as readers, an incident recognisable (and explainable) as a personal 
trouble. These recontextualisations give us anywhere to go but sociological. As a result, 
media reportage gets to mock an academic contribution to public debate without appearing to 
do anything but present, without embellishment, a contribution that made a mockery of itself. 
It is to the details of how this happened that we now turn our attentions. 
 
Method and materials 
With the aid of the keyword search function in Nexis (an online database), a corpus of 37 
secondary reports was collected from UK newspapers (Express, Guardian, Mail, Metro, 
Mirror, Nottingham Post, People, Sun, Daily Telegraph), their internet spin-offs (Express 
Online, Guardian Online, Mail Online, Telegraph Online, Times Online) and an international 
news agency website (BBC News). The extracts selected for analysis are representative of the 
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methods of recontextualisation observed across the data-set. Data were analysed using 
mediated stylistics, an analytic approach that adapts tools from membership categorization 
analysis and stylistics to and for the study of media texts as inherently interactive, literary and 
intertextual phenomenon (see Attenborough, 2015): interactive in that they ‘display an 
orientation and sensitivity to’ their intended recipients (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1997: 
727); literary in that features of what we might think of as strictly ‘literary language’ are also 
to be found in media texts (Jefferies and McIntyre, 2010: 3); and hypertextual in that they 
allow for (indeed in an internet-age “encourage”) massive polylogic games of “Chinese 
Whispers” whereby newer texts generate altered versions of older texts via processes of 
excision, expurgation, reduction and amplification (Genette, 1997: 5-8).   
 
Analysis 
Presented below are the opening sections from WMRM.  
 
 
 
The analysis is divided into two sections. The first compares WMRM’s version of the initial 
classroom incident as more-than-just-a-personal-trouble (lines 1-9) to its appearance in 
subsequent recontextualisations as only-and-ever-a-personal-trouble. In a similar vein, the 
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second section compares WMRM’s reification of Coates’s claim to have “discovered” an 
issue-in-a-trouble as solid and literal (lines 10-18), to its ironization in subsequent 
recontextualisations as partial, interested and/or defective.  
 
The personal trouble that was(n’t ) 
Let us start by examining how the classroom events that precipitated Coates’ public 
intervention were staged (Extract 1, lines 1-9). Of immediate interest here are the person 
references ‘Jennifer Coates’ (line 1) and ‘Professor Coates’ (line 2). Both make sense as 
third-party person references. But they are not equivalent. Each brings its own locally 
specific contingencies and consequences. ‘Jennifer Coates’, for instance, is a standard way of 
doing reference to someone whilst attempting to convey that nothing special is intended 
(Jackson, 2011: 33). She is “just” a woman with a name. But Professor Coates is a ‘marked’ 
reference (Enfield, 2007: 97), readable in this context as inviting recipients to inspect the talk 
for what else is being done in addition to reference. So ‘why that now?’ (Schegloff, 1996: 
439). Because it marks an aspect to Coates’ identity that WMRM wants to show-off to 
readers as having been available to students. As compared with gender or age-based 
categorial incumbencies, a Professorship is not immediately glance-available. In that it is an 
essentially ‘revelatory matter’ (Jayyusi, 1984: 68), Extract 1 makes clear that “revelatory 
work” took place in the classroom. That she was ‘formally’ (line 2) introduced – as opposed 
to “just” introduced – acts cataphorically, cueing us to receive her later on line 2 as more than 
‘Jennifer Coates’. Her formal introduction is as marked and extra-ordinary for us as it was – 
or should have been – for students. To show us this is to show us that a simple 
misunderstanding cannot adequately account for the way pupils quickly relabelled a 
Professor as a Miss. Also significant here is the way a third-party with the status of a 
‘headteacher’ (line 3) presents Coates not just via the categorial title ‘Professor’ but via 
actions (lines 3-6) that a person to whom that term is legitimately to be applied should be 
seen to be doing (Jayyusi, 1984: 73). In this way both the visibility and the objectivity of her 
marked status to and for students is established. For a ‘headteacher’ is not just any type of 
person. As a category, it is conventionally heard to impute to its incumbents certain areas of 
expertise (Widdicombe, 1998: 52-53). It is, for instance, readably expectable for a 
headteacher’s ‘status-based authority’ (Enfield, 2011: 300) to encompass her/his school and 
the rights to assess the authenticity of those entering into that school. The headteacher’s 
introduction thus helps to externalise Coates’s Professorial status: rather than appearing as the 
(possibly) idiosyncratic claim of a vain/deluded woman, it becomes readable as ‘a widely 
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recognised (and hence objective) state of affairs’ (Woolgar, 1988: 75). Again, this invites us 
to find it as difficult as pupils should have found it to approach Coates as anything but a 
Professor. 
Her third-party introduction serves another purpose here too. Coates’s status is a 
difficult phenomenon to manage. On the one hand it has to be referenced: in the absence of 
any discussion of how and when her status was made relevant, her relabelling would appear 
far less like a sociological puzzle. On the other hand to include your own status as a 
constituent element within a story risks exposing that story’s ‘subject-side’; that is, the 
possible biases and motivations that might have driven you to construct that particular 
version of events (Edwards, 2005). Self-praise (or any attempt to publicly invoke a social 
hierarchy whilst locating one’s own elevated position therein) is a difficult interactional 
phenomenon to pull-off (Attenborough, 2011). As competent social members, we tend not to 
assume entitlement to make such claims because we know that our words may become 
accountable to others as ‘overly subjective, biased and invested’ (Speer, 2012: 56). In that 
‘status’ is so readily understandable as involving personal claims to social esteem, Coates’s 
story could have ended up revealing more about the narrating-subject (Coates and her ego) 
than about the narrated-object (the classroom interaction). So the fact that a ‘headteacher’ 
introduces Coates is far from an irrelevant detail: as the introduction’s principal, author and 
animator, this character establishes epistemic distance between Coates and the public 
announcement of her status (Goffman, 1979).  
Logically we also know that it must have been Coates who experienced Extract 1’s 
reported events before recounting them to a journalist. An obvious way to represent those 
experiences, then, would have been via direct speech (e.g. “When I began volunteering…” 
etc.). Narrative control – and by implication epistemic access – would in this way have been 
ceded to Coates. But with the exception of lines 2-3’s indirect speech with a reporting clause 
(‘the headteacher told them…’), lines 1-6 have a free indirect mode of representation. This 
blurs the focus such that it is difficult to distinguish whether the experiences recounted are 
attributable to Coates or the journalist (Simpson, 2006: 82). Epistemic access appears as if 
shared: in that the journalist appears as an intra-diegetic narrator on the same narrative level 
as the story, we get to see what happened not just through Coates’ own potentially biased 
eyes but also through those of someone with no obvious stake in the telling of the story 
(Rimmon-Kenan, 2005: 95).     
Finally, consider how Extract 1 constructs the un-expectable – and by implication 
“sociologically curious” – nature of the student’s behaviour. The imprecision of the 
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headteacher’s free indirect speech allows only for those status-based details necessary to the 
presentation of this classroom incident as more-than-just-a-classroom-incident to appear 
(lines 2-6). During the presentation of Coates’s labelling (line 7) and relabelling (lines 8-9), 
however, it is the precision afforded by direct speech that performs that same function: 
simple misunderstandings or mishearings are rendered less plausible as explanations for what 
happened precisely because we get to know exactly what was said. This leaves us with few 
places to go but sociological if we want to find a solution to the puzzle of Coates’s 
relabelling. Note also that across most of this section (lines 5-12), story and text-time are 
almost identical (O’Toolan, 2001: 48): the pace of telling is such that both free-indirect and 
direct details of what was said would have taken almost as long to say as they now take to 
read. Crucially though, the way the full-stop separating ‘…with the students’ from ‘A girl put 
up her hand’ (line 8) momentarily allows story-time to become longer than text-time. This 
aids in the channelling – or ‘captation’ (Latour, 1987) – of recipients. It creates an ‘ellipsis’; a 
point at which no text space is spent on a piece of story duration (Bal, 2009: 101). Logically, 
we know that if a girl feels it necessary to ‘put up her hand’ and ask for help, various other 
events (tasks being introduced, guidelines being set, materials being studied, etc.) must have 
happened after the headteacher left the room (lines 7-8). But none are reported. In that the 
switch from Professor to Miss now appears virtually instantaneous, another simple 
explanation for what happened – i.e. that students simply forgot her “proper” name – is 
rendered less plausible.  
In Extract 1 the readability of what happened as potentially symptomatic of wider 
public issues hinged on the availability – for us and for students – of Coates’ Professorial 
status. In subsequent recontextualisations, however, Coates’s Professorial identity either 
disappears from sight or is made to appear questionable. In Extract 2, for instance, we can see 
how this affects our ability to understand Coates as sociologically imaginative. 
 
 
 
To be sure, as in Extract 1 we learn that she was ‘introduced’ to students (line 1). But we get 
no details as to the identity (or the footing) of the person giving that introduction. Not only 
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does this delete any sense that a relabelling took place. It provides for a reading whereby 
Coates’s status as “Professor” was never mentioned or made visible to the students at all. 
Consider the third-party person reference ‘Jennifer Coates’ (line 1). It is precisely its lack of 
inferential loading that makes the categorisation so inferentially rich (cf. Stivers et al., 2007: 
4). Of course, in Extract 1 Coates was also initially described as ‘Jennifer Coates’ (line 1). 
But these two ostensibly identical referential strategies do not, in and as part of these separate 
Extracts, have the same procedural consequentiality. Extract 1’s reference to ‘Jennifer 
Coates’ was followed by a passage that showed Coates getting presented as a Professor (lines 
2-6). To see her presented as an incumbent of that glance un-available category was to pre-
empt any suggestion that students could have missed that aspect to her identity. Extract 2, 
however, provides no direct representation of her introduction. Across lines 2-4 all that 
follows ‘Jennifer Coates’ is something that reads as if Coates’s own ‘shocked’ (line 2) 
retrospective opinion about that introduction: although the passage has a heterodiegetic, third-
person narrative form its smooth transposition into the homodiegetic first-person form ( “I’m 
the Emeritus…”), along with its inclusion of informal, idiomatic expressions (“after all”), 
suggests how strongly the voice on offer is that of Coates herself (Simpson, 2014: 29). And in 
the absence of any other textual information about that introduction, we may read ‘Jennifer 
Coates’ as an accurate description of how she was introduced, and how she became visually 
available to students. Showing us ‘Jennifer Coates’ foregrounds the invisibility of her 
Professorial status; its lack of glance-availability. It focalises Coates as students in a 
classroom would almost certainly have focalised her: as just a(nother) woman and just 
a(nother) Miss (cf. Land and Kitzinger 2007, 498). But if the pupils’ actions in labelling as 
Miss a woman introduced to them in a classroom as ‘Jennifer Coates’ now seem entirely 
expectable, what of Coates’s own actions?  Extract 1 took care to present her personality as 
anything but a resource for explaining (away) her interest in this incident. In Extract 2, 
however, Coates’s fixation with status renders her epistemic access to events readably 
questionable. The pupils, the journalist and – via the journalist – us, as recipients, get to see 
her as she really was: glance-available as a woman called “Jennifer Coates”. It is only Coates 
who now seems to think she radiates a Professorial aura so powerful that even her mere 
presence in a room should be enough to alert anyone, young or old, to her greatness: it is the 
sentential adverb “after all” (line 2) that enacts the casual confidence with which Extract 2’s 
Coates assumes her status as ‘available for the looking’ (Jayyusi, 1984: 68-73). In that it 
does, a comical ‘reality disjuncture’ is created between us and her (Pollner, 1974).  
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 By itself, one instance of Coates’s Professorial identity getting deleted would not be 
significant, principally because a series of newspaper articles will usually be varied. But this 
type of recontextualisation appeared throughout the data set. Consider Extract 3.   
 
 
 
Being introduced to students “as” a Professor (line 1) is not the same as being a Professor 
who gets introduced to pupils. Only the former orients-to this aspect of a person’s identity as 
revelatory. But if Extract 3 acknowledges that Coates’s identity needed explaining, it does 
little to establish how this was achieved. Consider the quote marks around ‘’Professor’ (line 
1). They allow for various readable interpretations. First, they might indicate a stretch of 
direct speech; an acknowledgement that someone, at some point, uttered that word whilst 
introducing Coates. In the absence of other details, “Professor” – precisely because a detail 
apparently so crucial is allowed to appear as direct-speech – could be taken to represent all 
that was said; a passing remark, easily missed or misheard, before the class was handed over 
to ‘Jennifer Coates’ (lines 3-4). Certainly, the possibility of pupils either having forgotten or 
misunderstood the word Professor – which now, of course, appears in isolation and without 
explanation – is enhanced by their infantilization from ‘students’ to ‘pupils’ (line 1) and 
‘youngsters’ (line 4). Second, though, Professor might just as easily be taken to indicate 
scare-quotes; that is, features that imply ‘a distance between the writer of the text and the 
words being quoted, and some element of disapproval’ (Jefferies, 2010: 140). They might 
suggest the out-of-place-ness of Professor in this particular locale; the journalist’s opinion 
that a Professor’s category entitlement is coterminous with the boundaries of the academy 
(Watson, 1976: 69). Or, alternatively, they might suggest “Professor” as a term of 
‘estrangement’ (Fowler, 1996 in Simpson 2014, 133); a way for the journalist to signal 
his/her unease as to the legitimacy of Coates’ claims to incumbency of that category.   
The point in identifying these various readable interpretations is not to suggest that 
they exhaust our interpretive options. It is simply to note that they are there. Extract 1 made it 
difficult to wander from a story in which an issue was slowly being extracted from a trouble. 
Extract 3, on the other hand, provides various inferential pathways for us to find, follow, and 
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in following suspect that the story might involve nothing more than a woman caught up in her 
own troubles. It is worth noting, though, that Extract 4 actively foregrounds the possibility of 
Coates having claimed a status she had no legitimate right to claim.  
 
 
 
Whereas Extract 1 pre-empted readings of Coates as status-obsessed, Extract 4 gives us 
someone whose status claims were built from a ‘preference’ (line 3) not “actual credentials”. 
The latter would have been readably bad enough given its suggestion of self-praise/adulation. 
But the former is catastrophic for Coates’s readability as a sociologically imaginative thinker. 
It is Coates’s re-categorisation from academic to ‘teacher’ (line 1) that changes entirely the 
rights she can be expected to claim (Watson, 2009: 45). “Teachers at girls schools” certainly 
may have, but in the absence of any further information are not easily readable as having, 
entitlement to use the title Professor. It is difficult, therefore, to connect the action of 
“preferring” the title Professor to the category ‘teacher’ without finding the action in some 
way odd or inappropriate. Indeed in a context where her status as a teacher appears without 
scare-quotes, “Professor” (line 3) modalises her claim to that status. The scare-quotes suggest 
that her “preference” for this title – her mere whim or fancy – is all that she has: reality 
(teacher) is thus differentiated from fantasy (“Professor”). In that her preference for this title 
does not follow from her incumbency of the category “teacher”, a category puzzle is first 
created…and then quickly resolved via our ability to make inferences as to the “deluded” or 
“vain” type of teacher that might habour such a preference. Hierarchically re-ordering the 
category ‘teacher’ into its moral types in this way allows for Coates to both be a teacher and 
to have such preferences (see Wowk, 1984). And whether we do or do not then go on to infer 
other candidate activities for a “deluded” (or whatever) type of ‘teacher’ to perform, Coates’s 
sociological imagination is already all but lost. In any description of a person, there will tend 
to be an ‘implicative fit’ between descriptive items such that they appear normatively and 
conventionally consistent with one another (Jayyusi, 1984: 101). To know that Coates is a 
vain teacher is already to have deleted just about any possibility of her also, and at the same 
time, coming to seem capable of “extracting a public issue from an ostensibly personal 
trouble”.     
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The (flawed) discovery of an issue in a trouble  
There are some interesting parallels between the strategies at work in this data-set as 
journalists reported Coates’s discovery of an issue-in-a-trouble, and the ways scientists 
present their claims to have discovered a phenomenon out-there-in-the-world. Claims to 
scientific discovery exhibit an ‘interesting awkwardness’ (Woolgar, 1988: 101). Scientists 
have to be involved in making such claims. But they also have to appear un-involved, 
minimising the possibility of “the discovery” appearing as if the product of their 
manipulation, their fabrication, their fraud (etc.). The writing style we intuitively recognise as 
“scientific” is an attempt to minimise that awkwardness: scientists appear merely to be 
authoring claims for which the out-there data stands as principal (Latour, 1987). For Coates’s 
discovery to publicly come-off right she too needed to appear involved-but-not-too-involved; 
that is, led by data rather than pre-packaged personal/theoretical biases and pre-dispositions. 
Across the data-set, however, such ‘awkwardness’ was not always minimised. WMRM and 
its recontextualisations both oriented-to this style of discovery-presentation. But WMRM did 
so to reify Coates’s discovery as solid and literal, whilst recontextualisations did so to ironize 
her attempted discovery as partial, interested and/or in some way defective.   
Let us start with WMRM. Coates’s ‘extreme surprise’ (Extract 1, line 10) is an 
anaphoric reference to its localised and highly specific object: the way a pupil relabeled her 
as “Miss”. But as we move through the text this object is re-formulated to index something 
beyond itself: an ‘awful disparity’ (line 11); an ‘example’ (line 13), and then later, in the 
journalist’s words, a ‘discrepancy’ (line 15). Each successive formulation provides a means 
for demonstrating the evidential – rather than “personal” – basis of and for Coates’s 
‘surprise’. The trick here is the way these words/phrases switch register, from a recognizably 
mundane descriptive world to one in which statistical/social scientific terminology are 
involved. This matters for a number of reasons. First, because statistical terms and concepts 
are readably docile, a-theoretical and disinterested (see Rose, 1999). They allow for the 
creation of a domain in which ‘technical expertise can appear to dominate political [or, we 
might add, personal] debate’ (Hopwood, 1988: 263). To build a discovery-claim on the basis 
of examples of discrepancies and disparities is to avoid any reference to local and potentially 
subjective feelings on the one hand, and global and potentially motivated theoretical 
frameworks on the other. This effect is heightened in other ways. The action description 
‘noted’ (line 15) provides for a very different reading of how the ‘discrepancy’ emerged than, 
say, “suspected”. To suspect implies prior-knowledge; a motivation for visiting certain 
16 
 
locations at certain times. ‘Noting’ implies naivety; an act of looking-up from an intended 
activity to see something unexpected. Similarly, the basic narrative structure of the sentence 
beginning line 11 is a version of the formulation ‘at first I thought [x], but then I realised [y]’ 
(i.e. “at first I didn’t think [that there was this awful disparity] but then I realised that [these 
young teachers are all Sir and I’m not]”). It purifies Coates’s discovery-claim, freeing it of 
subjective obstacles. To report that she did not think there would be an ‘awful disparity’ 
(lines 11) is to pre-empt any suggestion that she had a (theoretical) axe to grind, knew what 
she wanted to find and was going to find it come what may. Similarly, to suggest that she 
only realised her error after experiencing a classroom first-hand, is to make clear that it was 
not motivated theoretical dispositions, but the data available to her in that classroom that 
precipitated the realisation (cf. Sacks, 1984).     
So these words matter. They background subjective phenomena capable of rendering 
Coates’s discovery as readably flawed. But they matter for a second reason too: they allow 
for a de-differentiation of Coates’s experiences (cf. Timmermans, Bowker and Star, 1998: 
203). To describe something as an impertinence or a discourtesy would be to locate that 
something as a private matter. Evidence of and for “it” would derive largely from subjective 
feelings. To describe something as an ‘example’ of an ‘awful disparity’/‘discrepancy’ is, on 
the other hand, to discover that something as a publicly observable-and-reportable thing: 
something that happened to you has not just happened to you; in that it has happened to many 
others too, evidence of and for “it” resides not in your feelings, but in the many other 
instances of it out-there-in-the-world. Consider, for instance, the emotion word ‘depressing’ 
(line 13). It takes as its object an “it” which represents a personal trouble. But this “it” is 
quickly reformulated as an ‘example’ (line 13). Coates’s seemingly isolated “it” is thus 
transformed into one amongst many contextually specific examples of “it”, where the 
unifying factor, identifiable in all, is a particular public issue: how language-use (re)produces 
women’s lower status vis-à-vis men. Even the present-participle form ‘depressing’ helps to 
present a Sensor turned outwards towards the world (“it is depressing”) rather than inwards 
(cf. the past-participle form “I am depressed”). As a result, the classroom incident is no 
longer a ‘one-off’ but a ‘classifiable event’ (Hopwood, 1988: 261). Subjective specificities 
have been stripped away to reveal an important set of objective generalities. Unlike 
“feelings”, that cannot be transported to other locales and found, therein, in exactly the same 
form, ‘examples’, ‘discrepancies’ and ‘disparities’ are usefully ‘immutable mobiles’ (Latour, 
1987). Describable and knowable in the same way and as the same type of phenomenon in 
any given context, they are transportable and can thus be used to establish ‘bonds of 
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uniformity’ (Cline-Cohen, 1982: 43) between sites that might otherwise, at the level of 
individual feelings, appear different.  
In recontextualisations of WMRM, however, evidence of and for Coates’s discovery 
appeared less immutably mobile than mutably immobile: mutable because tied to Coates’s 
emotional state at that moment in that classroom; and thus immobile because irrelevant to any 
site beyond those in which Coates’s personal feelings are at stake. Consider Extract 5.    
 
 
 
The suggestion that students ‘made her feel demeaned’ (lines 3-4) is interesting for its use of 
the past-participle ‘demeaned’. It appears throughout the data-set, and always as if something 
Coates had uttered in and as part of WMRM. But the word does not appear in WMRM. 
Neither the journalist-narrator nor anyone quoted therein uses the word. So the fairest thing to 
be written about it here is that it might – “might” – constitute an attempt to reformulate 
Extract 1’s ‘it is a depressing example of…’ (line 13). But if it is such a thing then it is not 
particularly helpful to and for the readability of Coates’s discovery-claim as free from 
personal biases/motivations. To be demeaned is to be lowered in dignity, honour or standing; 
to feel that one has been debased in the eyes of others (Oxford English Dictionary). In that 
this word – Coates’s supposed word – can be understood in such a way, it presents us with a 
woman who focalised what happened from a personalised and embittered standpoint. There is 
nothing here to suggest a docile or disinterested descriptive register. Coates’s first reaction to 
events appears not to have been to ‘think herself away’ from that personal milieu (cf. Mills, 
1959) but to “feel herself into it”. Almost immediately, in the space claimed by line 3’s dash, 
we see her starting to link what happened to her own unique sense of having been “lowered 
in dignity”. Whereas present-participle emotion words like Extract 1’s ‘depressing’ take 
intentional objects that are material, ongoing and thus potentially still out-there-in-the-world, 
past-participle forms like ‘demeaned’ almost always take objects that have been felt or 
sensed. Demeaned thus locates all of the hurt and wounding in Coates as an individual. And 
this hurt and wounded woman is, of course, the woman who then goes on to claim the 
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discovery of a public issue – women’s lower social status vis-à-vis men – in her own personal 
trouble. It is not difficult to read this and to start to suspect that her initial reaction might well 
have led to the production of a highly motivated and self-interested claim. In the absence of 
any reference to WMRM’s tale of her curiously immediate re-labelling – from Professor to 
Miss – there is little here but personal feelings to stand as an evidential basis for her claim. 
That she is subsequently shown ‘maintaining’ (line 4) her stance, suggests an action being 
done “despite” or “in the face of” available evidence.  
 The fact that she appears to have ‘felt’ (line 4) demeaned also serves to differentiate 
Coates’ experiences, locating what happened as entirely personal to her. Unlike Extract 1’s 
relational-process-action (‘it [Carrier] is a depressing example [Quality]’) in which both 
Carrier and Quality had their provenance in the external world, Extract 5’s mental-process-
action of “feeling” inhabits and reflects the internal world of Coates’s consciousness. 
Evidence of and for the demeaning can thus only derive from her as an individual. Subjective 
specificities are not so much being stripped away as added in. Note also that Extract 1’s 
‘depressing example’ (line 3) – which appeared as direct speech – is subtly altered. 
“Depressing” still appears as direct speech, but ‘example’ is given as if a journalist’s gloss on 
what she may – or of course may not – have gone on to say. To present Coates as principal 
solely to the word “depressing” allows for this feeling to become readably separable from an 
intentional object – i.e. an example – that resides out-there-in-the-world. And in the absence 
of any definitive sense that Coates thought of what happened as an “example”, there is no 
reason for us to assume that she did. In fact because we already know that, initially – in the 
first moments of shock following her treatment – she ‘felt’ demeaned, it is possible to read 
‘depressing’ (line 4) as a retrospective upgrade on the type of feeling generated by that 
treatment (e.g. “It made me feel demeaned…and that was depressing”). This moves us a long 
way from Extract 1’s ‘disparities’ and ‘discrepancies’. It becomes difficult to understand how 
Coates can justify her claim to have established ‘bonds of uniformity’ between her 
experiences and those of others elsewhere. All she appears to have by way of evidence are 
her own feelings of having been ‘demeaned’ and having found that experience ‘depressing’.   
 Across these recontextualisations we frequently encounter Coates not in the guise of 
Extract 1’s ‘noticer’ (line 15), but as someone who had gone out looking for feminist and/or 
politically correct trouble. Extract 6 is the headline to one such recontextualisation. 
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In that it has no Subject element, the second part of this statement takes the grammatical 
mood of an imperative (Simpson, 2014: 13). This is a common journalistic device for 
appealing to a ‘universal audience’: in that no-one is addressed, every-one is a potential 
addressee; that is, the type of person who should and would want to perform an act of 
expulsion from what are now, naturally, “our” classrooms (cf. Billig, 1995: 89). The way the 
verb ‘expel’ retains its base form and is not marked for tense also suggests that ‘Potty PC 
Profs’ are an ongoing problem beyond this particular story: there has been, is, and will 
continue to be a need for “us” to expel such people from “our” classrooms. But who are these 
people? Although a category like “Potty PC Profs” is not a once-and-for-all supra-contextual 
phenomenon it is, nonetheless, conventionally readable as a ‘snarl word’ (Talbot, 2007: 759); 
a means for categorising people who are known to over-politicise issues that are outside the 
sphere of conventional politics. To categorise Coates and her ‘Potty Prof’ colleagues under 
this umbrella heading usefully anonymises them. Rather than “individual subjects” – with 
names, biographies, particular research interests, nuanced and varied analytic perspectives 
(etc.) – we get “categorial objects”; that is, representatives of political correctness (Eglin and 
Hester, 2003: 55). Irrespective of their names, biographies and so on we now know the only 
relevant thing about them here, which is that they went into the classroom carrying political 
biases that could not but affect their ability to judge events impartially and objectively. In that 
the article’s headline provides these instructions for reading, the rest of the article is but the 
puzzle to a solution already proposed (Woolgar, 1988: 75).  
Even in recontextualisations where Coates and her colleagues appear to be working 
inductively, moving from localised data to wider arguments about that data’s significance, 
their arguments appear flawed and the data past its sell-by-date. This can be seen most clearly 
in Extract 7. 
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In the parlance of speech act theory, to ‘pronounce’ (line 1) is to attempt a performative 
utterance; that is, a description of a state of affairs that is also, and at the same time, an 
attempt to effect that state of affairs. But as Austin (1975: 14) notes, the difficulty with 
attempting such a thing is that ‘besides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative 
a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go off right if we are to be 
said to have happily brought off our action’. A pronouncement that two people are now 
husband and wife, for instance, only takes on illocutionary force when uttered by a certain 
type of person (a vicar) in certain circumstances (standing in front of a bride and groom) and 
in a certain type of location (a church). So what might it take for recipients to hear Extract 7’s 
expert pronouncement as having ‘gone off right’? Certainly what Extract 7 itself makes 
accountable as the answer to that question is an evidential base that takes the form of an 
enthymeme (lines 3-8). In textbook terms, an enthymeme is an abbreviated syllogism: where 
the latter involves two initial, usually interlocking premises that lead to a conclusion, the 
former omits one of the initial premises. The aim of this omission – again in textbook terms – 
is the rhetorical one of drawing author and audience into the same orbit such that the latter 
ends up producing the missing premise on behalf of the former (Gill and Whedbee, 1997: 
171). But this ideal-type account assumes that an enthymeme’s author, animator and principal 
all coalesce in the same person, and that, as a result, that person has a stake in making their 
enthymeme work for their purposes. In Extract 7 the principal stands either as the ‘expert’ 
collective (shown pronouncing via direct (lines 2-3) and indirect (lines 1-2) speech 
representation) or Coates as a representative expert (where the reporting clause on line 6 turns 
the first half of the sentence into a free indirect representation of her words before the second 
half presents what are now her utterances directly). Interestingly too, Coates’s apparent 
utterance, ‘ergo’ (line 5), offers up a form of cognitive enactment: it shows us the process of 
working-through – of logical argumentative deduction – taking place as these experts build 
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from data to pronouncement. The animator and author of the enthymeme, however, is a 
journalist. And this journalist allows for the enthymeme to function such that it cannot but 
fail to draw the audience into alignment with the reasoning – the ‘ergo’ type steps – of the 
‘experts’. The sentence beginning line 1 provides our first premise, whilst the sentence 
beginning line 5 presents the enthymeme’s conclusion. In-between a sentence provides 
instructions for unpacking the initial premise: for these experts, it seems, “previous years” 
means the 19th century ‘when the teaching profession was dominated by frustrated spinsters’ 
(lines 4-5). We are now well placed to find the missing second premise, and to do so 
ostensibly on Coates’s behalf. It can only be something like: “Nothing has changed since the 
19th century and schools are still dominated by frustrated spinsters”. This is important. For an 
audience to be persuaded ‘they must assume the…premise’. If they do not then ‘they will 
reject the argument as incoherent’ (ibid., 171). To find this premise is to remain entirely un-
persuaded. In the absence of the classroom episode, and everything that WMRM allowed to 
flow from it, the expert’s pronouncement cannot but fail to ‘go off properly’. In that things 
have quite obviously changed since the 19th century we are invited to see incoherence. Their 
‘ergo’ type steps are palpably illogical. Crucial, though, to our ability to read this report of 
failure as “plausible” (rather than “an exaggeration”) is the way the article from which 
Extract 9 is drawn cues us to understand that in finding “failure” we are not doing these 
“experts” any kind of disservice. Immediately prior to Extract 7’s flawed enthymeme the 
following information appears.  
 
 
 
This is of course a readably tongue-in-cheek “psychological profiling” of a certain type of 
person; a person likely to ‘go into academia’ (line 9). It performs ridicule but only where that 
performance has an alibi of irony firmly in place. But even if this profiling is not serious 
enough to be taken completely seriously, it is serious enough to be taken inferentially. 
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Beyond the tongue-in-cheek jokiness, the journalist is cueing us to see what unites these 
‘lunatics’ (line 4) and their disparate set of actions (lines 3-8): an obsession with pre-
determined PC theories that are incapable of hooking onto the world out-there. In that Extract 
7’s ‘experts’ are readably the same as Extract 8’s ‘lunatics’ we find an explanation as to why 
such weak data led to something as strong as a “pronouncement”. Their dogmatic belief in 
pre-determined PC theories meant that their interest in data was only ever likely to have been 
as marginal here as we know it has been in the past. In these ways, unobtrusively and without 
fanfare, a sociological imagination is deconstructed: an enthymeme that might otherwise have 
appeared just a bit too flawed for us to fully trust the journalist’s apparently objective 
rendering of it, ends up appearing exactly as flawed as we would expect given the 
characteristics of its ‘expert’ authors.  
 
For a public (and recontextualised) sociology?  
This article explored the interrelationships and tensions between public engagement (in 
general), public sociology (in particular) and media discourse. Across two interrelated 
analytic sections, a comparison was pursued between WMRM – an article in which the 
arguments, opinions and thoughts of a group of academics first appeared – and its subsequent 
mediated recontextualisations. In various ways, and with varying degrees of subtlety, those 
initial arguments, opinions and thoughts were re-constructed so as to appear readably flawed, 
biased and embittered. A sociologically imaginative working through of the public issues 
structuring a personal trouble was transformed into a sociologically pointless public 
projection of personal angst. In this conclusion I want to establish some links between this 
localised case-study of public sociology in action, and the wider social-interactional and 
linguistic challenges facing scholars participating in mediated public engagement activities.  
For Burawoy (2005) as for Mills (1959), public sociology involves not just an ability 
to connect seemingly personal troubles to the wider public issues shaping and structuring 
them. It is about finding ways to do so that can capture, engage and involve audiences beyond 
the academy. The former, as we all know from our weighty back catalogue of critical peer-
review comments – is not that easy; but as this article suggests, in a mediated society it is still 
much easier than the latter. Social scientists, in their publicly available texts and utterances 
will always seek to evidence the ability to think themselves away from the local and the 
personal (Mills, 1959). But to think yourself away is also – and at the same time – to 
communicate to others that you have, indeed, thought yourself away. In a context where 
universities are increasingly incentivising public engagement activities (either directly or 
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indirectly via the valorisation of “impact” work), the problem for social scientists is that to 
communicate with large non-academic audiences is – at least in part – to communicate in and 
through the media. This need not always be a problem (see Boynton, 2013; Downey, 2017). 
But flash-points undoubtedly arise whenever academics are forced to communicate indirectly 
with general audiences via intermediaries like journalists. Put bluntly, academics have a 
‘stake’ in producing sociologically imaginative work; intermediaries need not.  
Is it likely, then, that recontextualisations of the kind seen here will be discoverable in 
other, locally specific instances of public engagement? If we take seriously this idea of “local 
specificity”, then yes. For whilst the anti-feminist/PC tropes on display in 
recontextualisations of WMRM will be wearily familiar to feminist scholars, this familiarity 
should not blind us to their contextual functionality – or what discursive psychologists would 
term their ‘action orientation’ (see Attenborough, 2011). As depressing/irritating as they 
undoubtedly are, they represent little more than locally specific means to the ultimate end of 
rubbishing a particular form of public sociology. After all, the act of being anti-feminist, anti-
foreigner, anti-intellectual, anti-political-correctness, anti-research-that-doesn’t-fit-with-your-
pre-existing-beliefs or whatever is very rarely performed “just for the sake of it”. Any such 
performance is bound up, however inchoately, with a belief that the performance will expose 
as ludicrous some other’s claim to have transformed an apparently private trouble into a 
visibly public issue: these academics do not speak for “women” – they are just embittered, 
bra-burning old hags with various misandrist axes to grind; these blacks do not speak for an 
“oppressed minority” – they are just feckless thugs who cannot accept that they alone bear 
responsibility for their own poverty; these right-wing politicians do not speak for “the silent 
majority” – they are just whipping up hatred of foreigners in order to satiate their lust for 
political power; and so on. In each case, one group’s sociological imagination is 
recontextualised as another group’s psychological delusion. It therefore stands as an 
interesting and timely empirical question as to whether and how those academics whom the 
media would destroy – e.g. feminists, socialists, environmentalists, conservative thinkers – 
they first make authors of public sociology with little or no sociological value.  
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